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ABSTRACT
This paper offers a novel perspective on the benefits provided by the rotation of
administrators within legislative systems, by exploring the Committee
Secretariat (CS) of the European Parliament (EP) and their role as a source of
information utilised by legislators. Using qualitative interviews, I provide an
original outlook on the expertise of the Committee Secretariat after the
entrenchment of career mobility practices. I find that the advent of mobility,
where administrators are moved into a new position after a set number of
years, is altering the culture of the Secretariat away from area specialists and
towards greater concentrations of highly adaptable generalists. I provide an
account on the functions of mobility and the benefits it provides from
encouraging a more encompassing understanding of institutional practices.
From gaining a wider knowledge, by working on different committees,
administrators may be of greater usefulness to lawmakers.
KEYWORDS European Parliament; Committee Secretariat; mobility; administrative systems; expertise
Introduction
Bureaucracies have been a subject of attention, ever since Weber’s consider-
ations, for those seeking to understand legislatures and how administrators
impact the thinking of policymakers (Huber & McCarty, 2004). Depending
on the parliament, its evolution and topography, administrators can be a
utility which lawmakers utilise during legislative decision-making processes,
applying the informational expertise gained from these officials when seeking
to favourably affect outcomes (Högenauer & Neuhold, 2015), enabling legis-
lators ‘to be politically influential players’ (Högenauer et al., 2016, p. 6). This
notion is advanced by informational theorists (Krehbiel, 1991) and observed
within cases such as the European Parliament (EP) at a tertiary level (Ringe,
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2010). While several studies have begun to illuminate the apparatus of the
EP’s administrative systems (Neunreither, 2002; Winzen, 2011; Marshall,
2012; Egeberg et al., 2013; Dobbels & Neuhold, 2013; Egeberg et al., 2014;
Neuhold & Dobbels, 2015; Högenauer et al., 2016; Pegan, 2017), a consider-
able expanse concerning their presence in the organisation of the Parliament
is still left unknown. Egeberg et al. (2013) have described consideration of the
Secretariat, the Parliament’s administrative actors, as an area of sparsity with
an inadequate volume of scholarly work existing. This paper explores the still
murky, yet significant, area of the Committee Secretariat (CS) as a key com-
ponent of the Parliament’s internal organisation, and the intervening impact
which career mobility practices should have had – on their ability to support
legislators.
Understanding of administrative turnover in comparative legislatures,
when a bureaucrat leaves their system (Dahlström & Holmgren, 2019), has
developed over time alongside accompanying knowledge upon the informa-
tional asymmetry which exists between officials and legislators resulting from
electoral turnover (Lowande, 2018). The EP committee system, however,
offers an intriguing exploration of administrative rotational turnover result-
ing from career mobility practices. Governments, typically, are the chief
repositories of informational expertise, giving them their ability to write pol-
icies, opposed to legislatures which are disadvantaged with, generally, less
expert capacity vis-a-vis executives. Administrators assist legislators to
deliver upon their democratic mandates by the, potential, amelioration of
this gap in expert capacity (Huber & McCarty, 2004). The Committee Sec-
retariat complete crucial administrative functions which keep the legislative
process efficiently turning-over (Neunreither, 2002). How, however, does the
practice of career mobility affect the resource of informational expertise
which policymakers seek from administrators to be influential? By addres-
sing this question, this paper explores the informational utility of the CS
and the surprising impact which internal mobility rules, propagated in
2004 (Hayes-Renshaw, 2017, p. 109), have had.
While not endeavouring to affect legislation politically (but may (Winzen,
2011; Marshall, 2012)), the actions of the Secretariat will impact upon the
legislative system from facilitating the decision-making process and advising
political actors of their options (Högenauer et al., 2016). However, the infor-
mational utility which the CS can fulfil is conceivably affected by the mitigat-
ing factor of career mobility rotating officials away from areas of speciality
after specified time periods (Corbett et al., 2011). I observe mobility as
having a positive impact, contrary to some accounts, on the abilities of
administrators but simultaneously shifting their utility for lawmakers. The
CS may be retaining relevance by using mobility to create an even greater
pool of adaptable administrators possessing a wider comprehension of the
institutional systems.
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In this paper, I utilise Krehbiel’s (1991) informational perspective of legis-
lative organisation, adopting the conceptual approach that information equals
influence – the ability to alter outcomes towards preferences. Legislators
cannot determine with certainty the summative outcome of policy choice.
The fear of negative consequences drives legislators to acquire information
on the options available. Information may be manifested as an understanding
of the specialised technical aspects of a policy, or knowledge of sources, such as
administrators, to acquire this efficiently. Information may also be constituted
as understanding what solutions have been proposed previously, what was
acceptable to different decision-makers, or how to best manage the legislative
process (Krehbiel, 1991). The acquisition of information places a legislative
participant into a stronger negotiating position, knowing more than the oppo-
site party, and exploiting the asymmetrical informational advantage to their
strategic benefit during bargaining (Costello & Thomson, 2010). Obtaining
expertise costs time and resources, decision-makers seek the sources of exper-
tise which provide the highest information available for the relatively lowest
costs incurred (Gilligan & Krehbiel, 1990). In parliamentary systems it is
not exclusively the right to make a decision which defines influence but
equally the ability to fulfil the potential, that decision-making involvement
gives you, by the consumption of information and what variables, such as
mobility, affect this resource (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2011).
After reviewing the functions of the CS and the potential consequences of
mobility, discussion turns to the approach adopted and how the data col-
lected is utilised. Once the merits of the research design have been
specified, the data is considered before a discussion on the contributions
to the field of legislative decision-making and administrative organisation
is advanced.
Committee Secretariat
The Secretariat are the Parliament’s civil service, performing administrative
functions which could be expected in most parallel Western European
systems. However, like comparing one national civil service to another,
each has its own working culture. The term ‘administrative styles’ describes
the ‘standard operating procedures and routines that characterise the behav-
iour and decision-making of bureaucracies’ (Knill et al., 2016, p. 1059) –
effectively what does an administrative body do, resulting from engrained
practices and rules. Engagement with this level of the CS is not extensive
in publication. What has been discovered suggests they are performing
limited, but essential functions, being a usable utility supplying expertise
to political actors in what may be set, but not fully verified, circumstances.
The Parliament’s General-Secretariat are organised into 12 sectorial depart-
ments named the Directorate-Generals (DG). The DGs supply and organise
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administrators within the different areas under their remits, for instance DG
‘Internal Policies of the Union’ (DG IPOL) supplies the administrators for
those EP committees regarded as responsible for internal EU policy. There
were 5,273 General-Secretariat operating under the different DGs 7th term
(2009-2014) (Corbett et al., 2011, p. 219), increasing to 5,602 officials 8th
term (2014–2019) (Dobbels et al., 2016). Parliamentary officials are recruited
through open competition, and, typically, practice is to hire individuals
fresh out of higher education or early career phases (Högenauer et al.,
2016). From an initial stage the goal was to recruit ‘talented and committed
officials who thereafter devoted their talents to sustaining and extending the
parliament’s role and powers’ (Westlake, 1994, p. 197).
Within the Parliament decision-making is organised around a system of
20 standing (+2 sub) committees. When a legislative proposal is made by
the Commission, it is sent to the Council of the European Union and the rel-
evant EP committee. After the Treaty of Lisbon (enforced from 2009) the
Council and EP are co-legislators in all but select areas, each can propose
amendments or ultimately veto a proposal. Once a proposal is received, a
committee member will be nominated the ‘Rapporteur’ assigned responsibil-
ity for writing their committee’s position, which will, excluding extreme
instances, become the Parliament’s position. Assisting the Rapporteur will
be at least one committee administrator who follows the proposal until com-
pletion (Neunreither, 2002).
Each committee possesses a dedicated Secretariat unit staffed from rel-
evant DG resources. Staff lists are unfortunately not published by all commit-
tees, only being found in internal directories. Inside accounts and observed
directories, however, establish the average as 10 administrators, with 5 cleri-
cal assistants (performing secretarial duties), per committee. Depending on
size and influence accredited, some committees are staffed at elevated levels
and, concurrently, smaller committees operate below the average. The CS is
collectively over 200 members, spread across the 20 (+2 sub) committees and
any temporary special committees. Each department is led by a head of unit,
whose responsibility is to oversee their division and coordinate broad func-
tions with the elected committee chair. Below the unit head are administra-
tors at various levels of seniority. Seniority can be observed by which
administrator ‘function group’, referred to as ‘AD’, an official is assigned.
AD scales for the CS range from AD5 to AD14. Grades AD 5–6 are con-
sidered junior administrators, with AD9 and above senior officials (a unit
head must be grade AD9 or above). Promotions are dependent on positive
annual reviews but are only approved after a minimum of two years on a
current grade (OJEU, 2020). Accumulated service and competency are
both considerations regarding progression.
The Parliament does not publish statistics on how many administrators
are registered at each AD grade per Committee Secretariat, hindering the
4 D. A. ALEXANDER
ability to gauge a distribution of senior members. Being designed based on
the French bureaucratic model, however, administrators commonly stay
within the EU system with high tenures (Dobbels & Neuhold, 2013). Neun-
reither (2002) suggests that committees with more perceived influence do
attract a greater concentration of senior officials regardless of overall com-
mittee size. The average committee, nevertheless, possesses an assortment
of senior and junior administrators at various career stages.
Function
The day-to-day functions of the Secretariat are one area which has been
advanced with a qualified level of analytical work. The expected functions
are to assist Members of the Parliament (MEPs) within the legislative
process, and its efficient operation, by offering members an understanding
of processes and knowledge of the technicalities of policymaking with the
supplying of information (Neunreither, 2002; Egeberg et al., 2013; Egeberg
et al., 2014; Neuhold & Dobbels, 2015; Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood,
2017). This may take the form of assisting committee members draft own-
initiative reports, provide legal advice or, even, political guidance (Winzen,
2011) for proposed legislative amendments, support Rapporteurs writing
of reports and facilitate committee operations performing everyday organis-
ational tasks (Högenauer et al., 2016). Secretariat additionally provide infor-
mation to facilitate the EP’s oversight functions upon other EU institutions,
such as the Commission, resulting from the everyday interactions and culti-
vated relationships which develop between administrators in these bodies
(Egeberg et al., 2014).
Dobbels and Neuhold (2013; Neuhold & Dobbels, 2015) have proposed a
conceptual framework of functions which Secretariats may perform. Three
distinct roles are proposed: (1) Production: drafting reports and voting
lists (order proposed amendments are voted upon in committee), and prep-
aration of trialogue meetings (informal EP, Commission and Council nego-
tiations) – low to medium involvement in the legislative process. (2) Service:
provide briefings on compromise agreements, supply expert advice on policy
and procedural guidance – medium to high impact. (3) Steering: proposing
compromise agreements to Parliament’s political groupings and active invol-
vement within inter-institutional negotiations – high impact. Each of these
degrees of participation, however, can only be performed by officials with
incrementally higher levels of retained informational resources, or in
another word expertise (Dobbels & Neuhold, 2013). A bureaucrat without
the resource of expertise, developed from acquired information, will not
have much success in assisting legislators or an impact on the policy
process (Huber & McCarty, 2004). According to Krehbiel (1991), two
definable types of informational resources can be retained by administrators
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(and legislators), that of political expertise (referred to subsequently as
‘policy-making expertise’ to avoid misunderstanding its nature, which
reaches beyond partisan machinations) and technical expertise.
Technical expertise is the appreciation of the solutions which are feasible
at a specialised level, existing separately, but non-exclusively from policy-
making expertise (an individual may possess both). A legislative participant
may possess an understanding of the technical intricacies of an area and
apply this to drafting more sophisticated amendments resulting from a
specialist professional or educational background (Daniel & Thierse,
2018). An example would be a Secretariat possessing an advanced edu-
cational degree (a PhD) in chemical engineering while working for the
Environment committee. Technical expertise is often observed by the pre-
possession of these types of backgrounds, and the concentration of individ-
uals possessing these (Hermansen, 2018). Those without pre-existing
technical vocations, however, may still develop technical knowledge if
working for an extended period on policy where technical expertise is
required to participate. Technical information, drawn upon by legislators,
can be utilised to influence negotiating partners by widening or constraining
policy-choice or, assist in the formulation of proposals which are difficult to
oppose on technical competency grounds.
Policy-making expertise is the experience which officials acquire working
within a legislative system. With accumulated time spent in a committee
administrators can learn the system within which they operate, drawing a
specialist understanding of how policy is best drafted within the legislature,
an expert understanding of how legislative procedures are utilised for
optimal returns, and the political complexities of their area. In the example
of the Secretariat, Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) offer the potential output of
policy-making expertise in the form of their ‘production, service, & steering’
framework. Administrators must be experienced, understanding how best to
navigate their system, to participate successfully and propose compromise
agreements or to build the relationships needed to be regarded as competent
support agents by MEPs (Dobbels & Neuhold, 2013; Egeberg et al., 2014). The
CS assist legislators by providing policy advice on the preferences of other leg-
islative actors or even signalling to a member their own groupings preference
from retained policy-making experience. Administrators with policy-making
expertise may, furthermore, remember the successes or failures of a previous
proposal and advise legislators accordingly (Winzen, 2011).
The Secretariat are purported ‘carriers of the EP’s institutional memory’
(Pegan, 2017, p. 300), due to the lack of retained memory collectively
within MEPs (Dobbels & Neuhold, 2013). The rate of MEP turnover has
been consistently high historically (Treib & Schlipphak, 2019), therefore,
MEPs on a committee do not seemingly retain collectively significant
levels of institutional memory (Mamadouh & Raunio, 2003). While party
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assistants, or lobbyists, may act as an alternative informational repository,
legislators desire a proportion of information which lacks an interest-
based agenda to facilitate legislative decision-making, which the CS
provide (Egeberg et al., 2013). Dobbels & Neuhold (2013) observe this in
the case of the Fisheries committee, when MEP’s lacked expertise adminis-
trators had an increased role supplying information, to an extent that their
participation went beyond guidance to shaping outcomes. Both technical
and policy-making expertise are collective entities, falling within the com-
munal basket of a CS unit’s institutional memory, the concentration of
each within a unit the greater the potential utility of that department as a
source of information for legislators. However, a mediating factor is see-
mingly in effect in the form of career mobility.
Within any professional realm there will be natural turnover of staff,
within the Secretariat this is exacerbated with mobility. The scheme was
expanded across the EU from 2004, previously being a limited practice to
becoming a general organisational approach. Once recruited, administrators
spend 3 years in an area linked to their professional or educational back-
grounds. After 3 years, extended to 7 years for two subsequent rotations,
the individual is obligated, the term ‘forced-mobility’ is often employed, to
enter a new position. The expectation is that after 10 years an administrator
will be in at least their third different position. Once 17 years is completed
rotational requirements may be relaxed considering an administrator’s age
and seniority. Beyond their first assignment there is no guarantee an
official would be moved into a position where they possess pre-existing
experience or expertise. Mobility, additionally, does not mandate rotation
be limited to the Parliament. While anecdotal accounts indicate the insular
nature of the CS leading to rotations frequently occurring internally, an
official may rotate to the CS from outside or leave to join other
bureaucracies.
Beyond partial accounts, and despite potential impact, the practice of
mobility has not been substantially considered within the EP. Corbett
et al. (2011, p. 229) have alluded to the significant effect which mobility
has seemingly had. While being a jarring process when first introduced,
mobility has become ‘accepted as introducing a degree of dynamism into
staffing policy’ (Corbett et al., 2011, p. 229), which appears to have been
the objective pursued by the head of the Secretariat, the Secretary-General.
Corbett et al. (2011) do not, unfortunately, elaborate on what ‘dynamism’
entails. Our general understanding of legislative turnover does, however,
not cast it in a positive light. Accounts of expertise within legislative
bodies, stipulate that it is most useful as a resource when an individual,
usually a legislator, is retained on the same committee for an extended
period, when they leave they take their experience with them (Weingast &
Marshall, 1988; Krehbiel, 1991; Mamadouh & Raunio, 2003; Woods &
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Baranowski, 2006; Lowande, 2018). Mobility could weaken the Committee
Secretariats’ retention of experienced administrators as a result of rotation.
This has been ventured by Marshall (2012, p. 1382), that mobility ‘has had
the unintended consequence of causing a severe loss to the secretariat’s insti-
tutional memory’. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood (2017, p. 743) offer a
similar interpretation of mobility, a loss of institutional memory, while, indi-
cating briefly, it has allowed for ‘an influx of new experiences’. The organis-
ation of mobility would indicate that technical expertise is undermined by
specialists being placed in areas where their expertise does not apply. Tech-
nical expertise is hard to retain if an administrator possessing it leaves a com-
mittee and is not replaced by an individual with similar expertise. The
Secretariat are, however, frequently portrayed as generalists (Marshall,
2012), so it is possible that the impact of mobility is less pronounced regard-
ing technical expertise.
Administrative turnover is associated with the fear of ‘a reduction in
experienced-based expertise, a consequent decline in effectiveness, and the
unhappy prospect of neophytes left in charge of complex and vital
matters’ (Salisbury & Shepsle, 1981, p. 381). If this is held to be reality, the
consequence of mobility should be a stark reduction of informational
resources retained within the CS. Before its application, however, adopting
a generally applied mobility policy was proposed as a solution to the challen-
ging environment which EP administrators find themselves in to ‘internalise
the unwritten rules’ of policymaking (Neunreither, 2002, p. 47). Considering
Corbett et al. (2011) allusions to dynamism and the brief reference to an
‘influx of new experiences’ by Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood (2017, p.
743), as positive by-products, the adoption of mobility may be understood
by adapting the idea of ‘Inter-Positional Knowledge’ (‘IPK’) developed in
studies of corporate organisation (Volpe et al., 1996; Cannon-Bowers
et al., 1998). Drawing understanding from the organisation of private com-
panies and applying it to parliamentary organisation is not a significant act of
cross-disciplinary heresy. Weingast & Marshall (1988) gained ample insight
into the organisation of the US Congress by comparing congressional com-
mittees to the operational practices of corporations.
When a corporate actor operates within different institutional positions,
learning new responsibilities, they develop ‘cross-training’ skills. IPK is the
expertise which an individual has gained from the process of cross-training
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1998). The employee has learned the function and
utility of the various players within the network of their organisation from
different experiences within the corporate body. They gain a broader under-
standing of both the resources and capacity of these different areas they have
worked within, or interacted with, applying this knowledge to future oper-
ations. Optimal working practices are more quickly disseminated across
different sectional areas from the exchange of positional knowledge.
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Actors possessing IPK bring a collective benefit of greater working efficiency
for the corporate organisation (Volpe et al., 1996). This could be considered
in a political science context, that a more holistic form of institutional
memory of the wider system is gained which can be applied to the benefit
of administrators and those utilising their experience. This resonates with
Neunreither’s (2002) suggestion that if mobility was widely applied, before
it was, EP administrators would benefit from possessing a broader under-
standing of the institutional systems, providing better tools to more
quickly learn the ropes of their position.
Has mobility had the impact of creating greater adaptability, despite the
negative characteristics attributed to turnover? If so, has this affected the
role of the Secretariat to involve the greater exchange of in-depth technical
expertise for an even broader understanding of the institutional systems?
Mobility may be the Secretariat’s response to reassert its utility for legislators,
focusing on providing adaptable civil servants.
Method
To explore the impact of mobility within the European Parliament, this
paper investigates the Committee Secretariats’ operations from 2004, when
mobility was first applied as a general policy, to the beginning of the 9th
term in 2019. This timeframe represents the period where mobility practices
were having their progressive impact felt, with those first affected finishing
their third fullest-length rotation in 2021, in the observable context of the
EP’s influential committee system. While the Lisbon Treaty placed the EP
and Council on a more equal legislative footing a deficit of informational
resources between the EP and the Council, who are privileged to the vast
expert resources of national executives, still remains, albeit notably
reduced by the expansion in MEP staff allowances and the creation of DG
Parliamentary Research Services, during this period.
This paper adopts a qualitative approach with the use of semi-structured
interviews to develop an account of mobility. A saturation of information
was reached with 34 interviews, 22 Secretariat, at senior and junior levels,
representing roughly one tenth of the Committee Secretariat, alongside 11
interviews with MEP offices (9 MEPs and 2 assistants) and 1 Commission
official. Interviews were conducted with Committee Secretariat, and
former staff working in capacities within the Parliament but now outside
the committee units, to gain direct knowledge of their capacity and how
they describe this in relation to mobility. The choice was made to conduct
supplementary interviews with MEP offices, to corroborate select claims
made by administrators and give qualified judgements on mobility. Inter-
views were conducted with CS representatives from a range of 16
committees.
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A thematic approach was used for the analysis of the data. Open coding,
manually gathering phrases, was adopted to identify recurring patterns
within transcripts. Categories were developed from interviews consistently
returning to primary themes during analysis of transcripts. The refined rel-
evant categories that emerged were (1) policy-making expertise/experience
and acquisition, (2) technical expertise/experience and acquisition, (3) the
effects surrounding turnover (leaving the committee system completely
due to retirement or career change) and (4) mobility (rotating to a new com-
mittee) impact.
Findings
As one political official stated ‘we have the Secretariat for all the formal
things’ and, importantly, ‘they already have the institutional memory’ that
MEPs require as a resource to utilise (Interview 1). The overarching narrative
(91% of interviews) from administrators, and supported by MEPs’ offices,
reaffirmed that the utility of the Secretariat involve support for MEPs, along-
side ‘helping to ensure a functional legislative process and coherence of
[MEP’s] proposals’ (Interview 2). Mobility has, however, affected the infor-
mational resources that the CS possesses in interesting ways.
Mobility is ‘a double-edged sword’ (Interview 3) providing drawbacks for
the ‘concentration of technical expertise’, alongside positives in the develop-
ment of well-rounded institutional knowledge (Interview 4). Mobility is ‘not
fostering the build-up of technical expertise’ (Interview 5), as ‘your next
assignment does not necessarily relate to the specialist knowledge you
learned in your first [Secretariat] position’ (Interview 4). The impact of
mobility is perceived as ‘not being a positive’ (Interview 5) and ‘counter-pro-
ductive’ (Interview 6) when considering only technical expertise, due to the
‘difficult nature of finding yourself in an area you do not yet know at a truly
knowledgeable level’ (Interview 7). Concurrently, ‘mobility is advantageous’
(Interview 8), granting ‘collective unit benefits’ (Interview 9), giving admin-
istrators the ability to develop a more encompassing understanding of the
institutional system and how to navigate the undercurrents faced.
Policy-making expertise
Initially from mobility ‘as a new person, inside the organisation, you can
see inside other departments’ and gain an understanding of the ‘different
policy-making dynamics’ which occur (Interview 3). Mobility officials
gain an ‘advantage’ from ‘understanding better these different areas’ and
retaining policy-making experience ‘operating across different depart-
ments’. A comprehension of ‘how the Parliament is working’ in a wider
context is developed and a knowledge of ‘what is the role or capacity of
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the different units [and] other legislative points of contact, and how to
operate in different positions’ is developed. This expertise is ‘applied to
our benefit’ serving to fulfil the expectations of MEPs ‘when finding our-
selves in new roles’. Officials gain from mobility a familiarity ‘of the
capacity, what we can get, get out of, or how best to manage’, different
contact points across the EU institutions to ‘assist in our role of coordinat-
ing the process’ (Interview 10). The ‘knowledge from mobility is transfer-
able’ and ‘can be used, or useful, in any unit once acquired’ (Interview 4). A
holistic ‘institutional memory cultivated by mobility’ is beneficial in pro-
viding a utility ‘to our Rapporteurs, with our acquired understanding of
the wider system and procedures’ and is more frequently required than
‘technical understanding is requested’ (Interview 11).
Different departments have diverse working approaches with some,
claimed as, ‘examples of best-practice which others are adopting’ (Interview
12). Avoiding judgement on which units are locations of optimal practice,
‘knowledge exchange’ does take place between ‘colleagues to improve
approaches’ (Interview 13). ‘Regular working groups’ operate between the
committee units, ‘reviewing the practices which take place’. Mobility, ‘creat-
ing a mix of institutional backgrounds in units’, alongside the working
groups, assists to facilitate the dissemination of perceived best-practice
(Interview 14). From ‘working with each other’ Secretariat develop expertise
upon the ‘formal and, importantly, the informal conventions’ surrounding
policy-making, and use this ‘to determine what is practical’ and ‘acceptable
to the political actors’, such as the Council or Commission (Interview 15, 16).
Advantages are provided from mobility at both individual and collective unit
level.
‘The formal legislative procedures across the committees are similar now’,
learning the formal and informal topography of one area can frequently be
then applied to future areas which must be navigated with similar undercur-
rents apparent (Interview 17). ‘Solutions from the process of a report in one
area can often be applied again’ from learning different positional roles with
mobility (Interview 11). Even when previous policy-making experience
cannot be directly applied, mobility officials are developing further skills of
‘adaptability’ (Interview 8), as opposed to only, inflexible, technical special-
isation (Interview 18). ‘The expectation is prepossession of [technical] exper-
tise is not demanded’ from a Secretariat in many cases. Technical expertise
can be accessed ‘from different sources, like the Commission, as required’,
so need not be pre-existing in all circumstances (Interview 11).
Mobility in these accounts only partly fits with our comprehension of the
negative aspects associated with administrative turnover. Those who experi-
ence mobility can develop more inter-positional understanding, helping to
facilitate the dissemination of optimal practices more rapidly or create
better conditions for this to occur.
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Technical expertise
The CS are more predominantly used as mechanisms for the transferring of
information from other informational nodes, rather than acting as contain-
ers of prepossessed technical information, in potential resignation that
mobility does undermine collective technical expertise. Although MEPs
recognise administrators as a potential ‘source of [technical] expertise’,
contact is not consistent, ‘some elect not to use Secretariat resources’
(Interview 14). These members ‘have their assistants, and advisors’ (Inter-
view 19) from political groupings, ‘so only rely on Secretariats to ensure
formalities’ (Interview 4). While some explain this as certain MEPs not
‘engaging for political reasons’ (Interview 20), legislators can develop
their own informational networks to an extent that the CS are ‘surplus to
requirement’ regarding the ‘supplying of [technical] information’ (Inter-
view 19). Committee administrators are not a guaranteed source of techni-
cal expertise, because of mobility, raising the spectre of less efficient
informational returns if relied upon exclusively by legislators. MEP
offices ‘receive and access the technical information from other sources’
outside of the CS, such as ‘parties or home contacts’ (Interview 21). If pol-
itical offices are developed, or a ‘professional background’ is prepossessed,
to the extent that MEPs are confident to rely on their personal epistemic
networks, Secretariat relevancy reduces (Interview 22). While a trend of
MEP offices not relying consistently on administrators for technical
support was evident, there were deviant cases.
Taking the example of the Budgetary Control (CONT) and Budgets
(BUDG) committees, a divergent pattern emerged. ‘MEPs, especially when
they arrive’ within the BUDG and CONT committees for the first time,
‘do not have the expertise we [budgetary Secretariat] have’ concerning the
EU’s technical budgetary mechanisms (Interview 23). Entering the 8th
term, the turnover of legislators on the budgetary committees was describe
by members as ‘extraordinary for its level’ (Interview 24) and notable for
‘the intake of fresh-faces’ (Interview 25). Expertise is retained by administra-
tors and deployed ‘to support members lacking technical understanding’ of
budgetary mechanisms (Interview 26). ‘We are the technical advisors: we
prepare everything a member could need regarding technical information
on budgetary policy’ (Interview 23).
While this could be regarded as the budgetary Secretariat’s own self-
importance, committee members and their offices supported this perspec-
tive. Budgetary committee members ‘are in contact’ with their Secretariat
to supplement technical expertise lacking from not possessing personal back-
grounds or experience relevant to EU budgetary policy (Interview 25). The
‘Committee’s Secretariat is very important for all MEPs here, they are
involved with it all, knowing how it works with the whole picture, having
12 D. A. ALEXANDER
the technical knowledge,’ which some members lack (Interview 27). Higher
MEP turnover may mean that the Secretariat has greater potential rele-
vancy, supporting the elevated need for technical information in a
difficult to penetrate area. Without experience of the ‘complex financial
mechanisms’ (Interview 25) utilised, budgetary policy can be a ‘difficult
area to engage with for the uninitiated’ (Interview 28), requiring extra
support. Similar themes emerged anecdotally from the International
Trade committee, that Secretariat, alongside senior MEPs, ‘helped to
supply technical expertise to new members’ (Interview 7) lacking ‘an
understanding of the feasibility of technical solutions’ (Interview 29,
30, 31, 32).
A deficiency of retained expertise in the insular budgetary committees,
accredited to MEP turnover, may increase the likelihood of members enga-
ging with administrators, placing more pressure on the CS to retain technical
expertise. Mobility would have a greater impact on these committees, than
those where legislators expect less technical specialisation.
Discussion
A nuanced interplay arises when exploring the resources utilised by the CS to
fulfil their expected informational functions once factoring for career mobi-
lity. The mitigating impact of mobility is more subtle than first expected.
When an administrator leaves a committee, due to career change, retirement
or by rotating to a new committee, they take their policy-making and tech-
nical experience relevant to the previous area with them. It was my informed
supposition, therefore, that mobility could weaken the retention of infor-
mation, hampering the Committee Secretariat’s ability to assist in the supply-
ing of specific expertise (Marshall, 2012; Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood,
2017). Mobility does negatively impact the concentration of in-depth techni-
cal specialisation, with possible caveats. Simultaneously mobility should pro-
pagate CS units with staff possessing, or developing, a more holistic
institutional memory by acquiring a positional cross-unit understanding of
policy-making processes. Administrators are acquiring more expedient
expertise, from mobility, upon the informal dynamics of policymaking,
which pre-mobility Neunreither (2002) assessed as being too often lacking
or was slow to be acquired.
The concept of Inter-Positional Knowledge predicts that from operating
across different positions and training in diverse responsibilities, an
employee becomes more capable, developing a wider knowledge of the
capacity of different departments, and facilitates the spread of best practice
by their movements. EP committee officials are observed as learning from
their experiences, working across different committees, and applying the
knowledge gained to future operations. By requiring administrators to
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rotate between positions, a generalist concept of policy-making expertise is
promoted, rather than one which is rigidly area exclusive. From acquiring
policy-making expertise beyond the area specific, administrators should
gain a more expedient general overview of how to engage with the legislative
process for optimal returns and obtain understanding on the preferences of
different actors, to appear as adept support agents and facilitate higher
potential levels of service or steering involvement. The accompanying
dilution of specific institutional memory, by mobility’s moderating effect
upon collective technical expertise in committee units, should not,
however, undermine the overarching support officials supply to legislators.
Technical expertise is not a ubiquitous demand from legislators in all com-
mittees, or one that officials could not often fulfil by utilising their acquired
knowledge of institutional sources of expertise, which have grown as the Par-
liament has matured.
The narrative this paper has constructed does explain what the ‘dyna-
mism’ that Corbett et al. (2011) have alluded to, as the impact of mobility,
pertains. The EP is utilising and developing, via mobility, adaptable
administrators who are more capable at engaging with a diverse range of
interactions during the legislative process and are a more flexible resource
for legislators to utilise. I question, therefore, parts of Marshall’s (2012)
assertion that mobility undermines institutional memory and collective
understanding of the legislative process, weakening CS informational
utility for legislators. This assertion by Marshall was made at a relatively
early stage after the harmonisation of procedures under Lisbon in 2009
and the entrenchment of mobility from its propagation in 2004, and so
may be less apt as time has progressed. I would qualify Marshall’s claim
that institutional memory is undermined. Technical elements of retained
collective memories are mitigated indeed, but at the expense of increased
collective adaptability.
Within the CS, a balance is maintained with those at a senior manage-
ment level who are generally not as impacted by mobility, with less require-
ment of rotation or having completed their rounds, and those in the
process of gaining IPK. Senior actors retain area specific institutional
memory vital to ensuring consistency of legislative actions, possessing
knowledge of past decision-making. Junior members who have experienced
mobility, learn from senior colleagues but alternatively provide a varied
perspective of actions and flexibility from their developing memory of
the wider system. Senior actors compensate for the area specialisation
which junior mobility Secretariat lack. Unit heads have been observed as
vast depositories of institutional memory (Roederer-Rynning & Green-
wood, 2017), informing junior members of practice and approach, along-
side other senior graded colleagues. This mix of institutional memories
creates a more dynamic whole which should be able to engage more
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flexibly with diversifying policy issues and disseminates the best practices
of different units more swiftly.
The informational advantages which administrators have when turnover
of legislators is high, and the potentially increased role this gives bureaucrats,
has been examined in comparative studies regarding the influence of legis-
lators (Woods & Baranowski, 2006). Similar to Dobbels & Neuhold
(2013), I find the impact of relatively higher MEP turnover and the require-
ment of technical expertise more emphasised in insular areas. Administrative
systems should respond to legislative composition. Future work, however,
should examine the potential direct relationship between MEP turnover
rates and the changeable utility demanded from administrators. This
would assist towards development of the conceptual frameworks of cause
and effect between legislator composition and administrative systems,
regarding expertise and capacity.
Conclusions
I find the objective of the adopted organisational practice of mobility is to
gain greater efficiency by compelling administrators to perform different
occupational functions as they progress the career ladder. From completing
these different functions, positional institutional knowledge is gained which
can be readily applied by administrators and utilised by lawmakers. By apply-
ing the notion of Inter-Positional Knowledge to administrators we may be
able to better explain the impact of administrators on decision-making
when rotation occurs.
Mobility has been promulgated to develop a generation of Secretariat with
an even more generalist approach, building on the services already highly
generalist attributes, in an increasingly political parliament where specialised
information originates more frequently from political sources. This shift
toward even greater breadth than depth of expertise is not uniform. Some
committee units are still expected to have a depth of specialised technical
expertise, to be utilised by MEPs, retained in the collective institutional
memory. A mark of developing maturity in many Western European parlia-
mentary systems is a demarcation between technical committees requiring
specialisation and political committees requiring knowledge of political pre-
ferences. The nature of the Committee Secretariat may signal a delineation
within the EP as part of the further institutionalisation of its structures.
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